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TAXATION - FEDERAL INCOME TAX - PUBLISHED OPINIONS OF
THE NEWTAX OFFICIALDOM: A REVIEW - President John F. Kennedy has appointed as his principal tax officials two men who have
long been on record as proponents of tax reform. This comment
is a collection and, to a small extent, an analysis of the opinions
found in their published statements on taxation. 1 Stanley S. Surrey, fifty-year-old Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax
Policy, first served with the Treasury Department in 1937. He
was Tax Legislative Counsel from 1942 to 1947 and later served
as Special Counsel to the House Ways and Means Subcommittee
on Administration of the Revenue Laws. He also has served as
Reporter of the American Law Institute Tax Project and as a
member of the Shoup Mission, which revised Japan's tax system
after World War II. Mortimer Caplin, a forty-four-year-old professor at the University of Virginia Law School when he was appointed Commissioner of Internal Revenue, is a member of the
Tax Advisory Group of the American Law Institute. The two
men have remarkably similar views on the general situation of the
federal income tax today and on most of the reforms they advocate.
Both fear a present and impending emasculation of the Internal
Revenue Code by popular disrespect and a gradual narrowing of
1 This comment does not cover in general the opinions of either official on taxation
of income earned abroad, or the estate and gift taxes.
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its base.2 The two factors, in their opinion, reinforce one another.
Widespread lack of confidence in the essential fairness of the tax
makes it easy for Congress to create tax shelters for pressure groups.
Tax shelters for pressure groups, and the complex code provisions
which they require, create further dissatisfaction. A two-pronged
attack on the problem is proposed: first, elimination of tax shelters
by legislation, litigation, and stronger enforcement; second, a reduction in rates to eliminate unfairness and congressional sympathy for high-bracket taxpayers.

I.

THE RoLE

MR. SURREY INTENDS To PLAY

Mr. Surrey has clearly outlined the active role he believes the
holder of his office should play.3 Mr. Caplin has published no
opinions on the proper function of the Commissioner. Believing
that tax policy and tax administration cannot and should not be
separated, Mr. Surrey favors close coordination of Treasury policy
and Bureau administration, with top-level contact between the
Treasury and the Bureau primarily his responsibility. Aside from
this coordinating function he feels that it is a prime responsibility
of his office to oppose effectively pressure groups which urge creation of tax shelters. He believes the Treasury must be an outspoken champion of tax fairness, which he believes is embodied
in a progressive tax with equality within brackets.4 He probably
can be expected, in the course of performing this function, to give
broad publicity to the low amounts of tax actually paid by certain
high-income groups and to recommend legislation requiring that
special proposals benefiting small groups be presented in the form
of private relief bills.5 Mr. Surrey's previous Washington experience should be of considerable value to him in his forthcoming
struggles with the lobbyists.
Mr. Surrey's publications indicate, although this is difficult to
substantiate by direct quotation, that where the statute is not
precise he would favor more aggressive Treasury action toward
developing new substantive tax law through the administrative
2 The tax base is, roughly speaking, that income to which the ordinary income
rates fully apply after taking into account the effect of exemptions, deductions, exclusions,
income separately taxed and credits against tax. Caplin, Threats to the Integrity of Our
Tax System, 44 VA. L. REv. (1958); Surrey, Do Income Tax Exemptions Make Sense1
102 CoNG. REc. A3053 (1956).
3 Surrey, Comment on the Proposal To Separate the Bureau of Internal Revenue-.
from the Treasury Department, 8 TAX L. REv. 155 (1953).
4 Surrey, The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist - How Special Tax Provisions Get
Enacted, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1145, 1164 (1957).
5 Id. at 1172, 1180.
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and litigation processes.6 Mr. Caplin, on the other hand, may
favor a closer adherence to the precise words of the statute, with
less administrative emphasis on "substance over form." At least
he has argued in this direction in the context of the thin-incorporation doctrine.7

II.

REASONS FOR AITACKING

TAX

SHELTERS

It is Mr. Surrey's thesis that Congress has maintained the
present high rate structure at the behest of certain pressure groups,
and that it points to the rate structure in defense when its other
tax legislation is attacked by those groups.8 However - his argument goes - Congress does not actually believe in high rates and
promptly emasculates the rates by creating tax shelters which are
not equally available to all taxpayers within a given rate bracket.
Both Mr. Surrey and Mr. Caplin believe present upper-bracket
rates are unfair because they are too high. 9 For the most part their
attack on tax shelters is based upon the inequities created within
rate brackets and the complexity caused by the shelter provisions.10
Occasionally, however, one or the other will move toward an
attack on the shelters solely because they enable the rich to escape
paying taxes.11 This latter viewpoint is somewhat inconsistent
with Mr. Surrey's thesis that the shelters were intentionally created
by Congress to mitigate the effect of rates he admits are too high.

III.

PROPOSED CHANGES IN ENFORCEMENT

Along with changes in substantive law, the new officialdom
wants tougher enforcement by an expanded and strengthened Revenue Service.12 In April the Kennedy administration asked Con6 See generally Surrey, supra note 3. See also Surrey, Memorandum Regarding Certain
Items in the List of Substantive Unintended Benefits, Hearings on Techical Amendments
to the IRC Before a Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee, 84th Cong.,
2d Sess., vol. 5, at 436 n.l (1956).
7 Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin Incorporation, 43 MARQ. L. REv. 31, 54 (1959).
But cf. Mr. Caplin's implied praise of judicial destruction of avoidance devices based on
the letter of the code. Caplin, supra note 2, at 841.
8 Surrey, supra note 4, at 1150; Surrey, Do Income Tax Exemptions Make Sense? 102
CoNG, REc. A3053, A3055 (1956).
o Caplin, supra note 2, at 844, 845; Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains
Taxation, 69 HARV. L. REv. 985, 1016 (1956).
10 Caplin, supra note 2, at 839, 840. Surrey, supra note 4, at 1146, 1152.
11 See, e.g., the criticism by both gentlemen of the dividends received credit. Caplin,
supra note 2, at 845; Surrey, The Federal Income Tax Base for Individuals, 58 CoLUM,
L. REv. 815, 820, 821 (1958). See also Surrey, supra note 4, at 1179.
12 Caplin, supra note 2, at 852; Surrey, The Federal Income Tax Base for Individuals,
58 CoLUM. L. REv. 815, 827-28 (1958).
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gress for thirty-four million dollars to hire 4265 more Internal
Revenue Service employees, and Attorney General Robert Kennedy has announced plans to increase the prosecution of tax evasion
cases.13
The enforcement proposals of Mr. Surrey and Mr. Caplin are
threefold: broader reporting requirements, greater withholding
requirements, and more careful auditing by an expanded Revenue
Service. Mr. Surrey would require more reporting from executives, employers, entrepreneurs, professional men, and farmers.
From the executive he wants more detail, especially in regard to
expense accounts.14 He would require employers to report separately all payments, in cash, kind, or use of certain facilities, made
to top executives and shareholders, whether or not the payments
constitute gross income to the recipient. The Revenue Service
would then be able to decide the latter point for itself.15 For
farmers, entrepreneurs, and professional men he would require
balance sheet reporting for those with non-investment, non-salary
income in excess of fifteen or twenty thousand dollars. This requirement would be extended down the income scale as details
were worked out.16
It has been estimated that three billion dollars of interest and
dividends - principally the former- is now unreported17 and
both men desire withholding of tax on interest and dividends as a
remedy.18 A specific method has been suggested by Mr. Surrey:
the debtor or corporation would withhold a flat percentage, equal
to the rate of the first bracket, without allowance for exemptions.
The recipient would then add the amount withheld to the amount
received in reporting his income and receive a credit for the
amount withheld. No individual withholding forms would be
filed with the government by debtors or corporations. The method
would insure at least some payment of the tax on all dividends
and interest, and insure perfect compliance in the first bracket.10
Both officials urge more efficient auditing. 20 Mr. Surrey suggests that committees of the American Bar Association Section on
13 N.Y. Times, April 21,
14 Surrey, supra note 12,
15 lbid.

1961, p. 19, col. 3 (city ed.).
at 827.

l6Ibid.
17 N.Y.

Times, April 21, 1961, p. 18, col. 7 (city ed.). The President states that the
effort to remedy the situation by education has failed. Ibid.
18 Caplin, supra note 2, at 852; Surrey, supra note 12, at 827.
19 Surrey, supra note 12, at 827 n.41.
20 Caplin, supra note 2, at 852-53; Surrey, supra note 12, at 828.
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Taxation and of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants be appointed to study the auditing procedure and suggest methods for making it more effective.21 He has also made
his own detailed suggestions for improving the auditing process: 22

I. Agents should be less susceptible to obvious errors left as
"bait" to draw attention from substantial questionable
items.
2. Agents should make more thorough pursuit of obvious
leads to information such as long-term reports on certified
audits showing reserves for taxes, corporate minutes, and
year-end accounting adjustments, which sometimes indicate
questionable accounting practices.
3. Agents should become acquainted in detail with taxpayers'
accounting systems by such methods as tracing vouchers
through the system and scanning inventory account sheets
for distortions in pricing methods.
4. Agents should check in detail the cost-of-goods-sold accounts
and include a scanning of a list of vendors to taxpayer to
tum up items purchased as fringe benefits for employees.
5. Agents should not be guided in their audits solely by the
classifications of items required by the tax return.

IV.

PROPOSED SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES

The new officials have specifically designated a number of substantive provisions which they consider to be undesirable tax
shelters. They have proposed legislative revisions of most of these
provisions, and it is to be expected that the litigation and administrative processes will also be used to develop the law whenever
practicable. Perhaps the most significant area of attack at the legislative level is on the present treatment and definition of capital
gam.

A. The Capital Gains Provisions
Both men urge revision of the capital gains provisions. Mr.
Surrey has for some time continued a sweeping attack on the treatment of capital gain. First, he feels there is nothing in the nature
of a capital gain which requires its separate treatment purely for
21 Surrey,
22 Surrey,

8 J.

supra note 12, at 828.
quoted in Methods of Improving Audits Performed by IRS Agents Discussed,
TAXATION 109 (1958).
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reasons of equity.28 Second, he believes capital gain cannot satisfactorily be defined and that congressional and judicial attempts
to do so cause one of the major complexities in our income tax
law.24 Third, he believes the separate treatment of capital gain
provides an easy and undesirable way by which Congress can create
tax shelters for pressure groups by giving a non-investment transaction capital gains treatment in lieu of an out-and-out lower rate
or averaging device.25
I. Proposed Changes in Capital Gains Taxation. While both
officials have made specific suggestions in the capital gains area,
Mr. Surrey's proposals are the more detailed. First, he would solve
the definitional problem primarily by making capital gain treatment less desirable, thus easing the pressure on the definition. 26
He would also narrow the general definition to include, insofar as
possible, only purely investment activities, but he has not been
specific about this change in the general definition.27
Second, he would raise the required holding period to three
years, with perhaps a decreasing rate scaled to the length of the
holding period in excess of this minimum.28
Third, Mr. Surrey would raise the maximum capital gain rate
to approximately forty-five percent and eliminate the deduction
for one-half of long-term capital gain. As an alternative, he would
consider applying the ordinary income rates coupled with a deduction of one-fourth to one-third of long-term capital gain. These
are mutually exclusive proposals; Mr. Surrey apparently does not
favor enacting both and giving the taxpayer a choice between the
two methods. The first proposal is the one he emphasizes.20
Fourth, he would increase the capital loss allowance, but he
has not been specific as to the size of the increase.80
Fifth, he would attempt to eliminate the tendency of a capital
gains tax to deter transfers of appreciated assets - commonly called
the lock-in effect- by (1) taxing unrealized capital gains at death
23 Surrey, in Federal Tax Policy for Economic Growth and Stability, Hearings Before
the Subcommittee on Tax Policy of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess., vol. I, at 320 (1955) [hereinafter cited 1955 Hearings].
24 See generally Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69 HAR.v.
L. REv. 985 (1956).
25 Surrey, The Federal Income Tax Base for Individuals, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 815, 819•
20 (1958).
26 Surrey, supra note 24, at 1016, 1019; Surrey, supra note 25, at 819.
27 Surrey, supra note 25, at 820; 1955 Hearings 327.
28 Surrey, supra note 24, at 1016.
20 Surrey, supra note 24, at 1016; 1955 Hearings 314, 344.
so Surrey, supra note 24, at 1016; Surrey, supra note 25, at 880.
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or gift, or (2) carrying over to the transferee the decedent's basis
in a capital asset transferred at death. The method he emphasizes
is taxing unrealized capital gains at death or gift.31
Sixth, the new Assistant Secretary would permit "averaging"
of capital gains by spreading them over the year of receipt and the
two previous years. 32
Seventh, he would tighten provisions on corporate reorganizations and distributions. He has not been specific about the nature
of this "tightening."33
Eighth, he would eliminate completely capital gain treatment
of a number of transactions which he believes do not involve sale
of investment assets, but which he believes were afforded capital
gain treatment as the result of astute lobbying and in lieu of lower
rates or averaging. Included are executive stock options, lumpsum termination of interests in pension trusts, sales of patents and
patent royalties, sales of coal, oil, and timber royalties, sales of
growing crops and breeding livestock, sales of real property and
depreciable assets used in a trade or business, and the notorious
Mayer3 4 provision.35
In his comments on capital gains provisions, Mr. Caplin has
cited the articles of then-Professor Surrey. However, his proposals,
which are less numerous, differ in some details. Notable differences are that he mentions increasing the holding period to "at
least one year," and proposes only one method for treating capital
assets at death - carrying forward to the legatee the basis of the
decedent. Upon sale of depreciable assets, he would deny capital
gain treatment except to the extent the sale price exceeded the original cost. With regard to the capital gain rate structure, he proposes
to eliminate the twenty-five percent alternate tax and to force all
taxpayers to use the fifty percent deduction. However, he, too,
doubts the desirability of separate treatment of capital gain in the
first place.36

2. Mr. Surrey's Views on the Desirability of Separate Taxation of Capital Gain. Mr. Surrey has published his views upon
31 Surrey,
32 Surrey,

supra note 24, at 1018 n.95.
supra note 24, at 1016.

33Ibid.

R.Ev. CODE OF 1954 § 1240. It is generally assumed that at the time of its
enactment the provision was applicable only to Louis B. Mayer and one other executive
of Loew's, Inc. Surrey, supra note 4, at 1147 n.4.
315 Surrey, supra note 24, at 1016; Surrey, supra note 25, at 819, 822; 1955 Hearings 314.
36 Caplin, supra note 2, at 846.
34 INT.
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five of the arguments often heard in the theoretical controversy
which rages over the issue of separate tax treatment of capital gain.
These are (I) an income tax should "tax the fruit but not the
tree"; (2) a capital gains tax has a harmful "lock-in" effect; (3) a
separate low rate on capital gains acts as a desirable stimulus to
saving and investment in the economy as a whole; (4) a capital
gains tax has the effect of a capital levy during a period of inflation;
and (5) capital gains are generally realized "in a lump," and a
low rate is therefore needed in lieu of an averaging device. 37
On the question of taxing the "tree" differently from the
"fruit," Mr. Surrey says, "I start with the viewpoint that these capital gains are dollars received by people and are like any other dollars. On equity grounds they therefore should be taxed the same as
any other dollars." 38 Walter Heller, Chairman of the President's
Council of Economic Advisers, agrees with Mr. Surrey on this
point.39 There are, of course, those who strongly disagree.40
Mr. Surrey feels that under the present rate structure the lockin effect is not serious. He bases this opinion primarily upon arguments of Mr. Heller.41 Mr. Heller's view, as expressed before
Congress, is that the severity of the lock-in effect under the present
rate structure has been greatly overrated. Mr. Heller bases his
opinion on three grounds. First, he feels that many market transactions are outside the deterrent effect of the capital gains tax
because made by tax exempt organizations or made for compelling
reasons which require that the tax be ignored.42 Second, he believes that in a dynamic market the change in values necessary to
compensate for the effect of a tax at transfer is relatively small.
For example, he states that "stockholders who accurately gaged
the pulse of the market" could easily more than compensate themselves for the effect of the tax by proper trading in thirty major
stocks during 1955.43 However, he admits the lock-in effect may
37 For vieivs generally opposed to those of Mr. Surrey on the capital gain question, see
Dan Throop Smith, Tax Treatment of Capital Gains, in 2 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS &:
MEANS, TAX R.EvISION CoMPENDIUM 1233 (1959) [hereinafter cited 1959 CoMPENDIUM];
Brown, 1955 Hearings 307; Magill, Federal Income Tax Revision, in 1959 CoMPENDIUM 87.
SB 1955 Hearings 320.
891955 Hearings 310, 318.
40 See note 37 supra.
41 Surrey, supra note 24, at 1018 n.95.
42 Heller, Investors' Decisions, Equity, and the Capital Gains Tax, in JOINT CoMM,
ON THE ECONOMIC R.EPoR.T, FEDER.AL TAX PouCY :FOR. ECONOMIC GR.OWTii AND STABIUTY
381, 385-86 (1955).
43Id. at 384-85.
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not be dismissed as insignificant upon this ground alone because
the investor must trade a certain tax for an uncertain market
change and because the tax may have a psychological effect unrelated to mathematics.44
Mr. Heller's third ground for doubting the severity of the
lock-in effect is a study of the impact of taxes upon the decisions
of 746 investors made under the auspices of the Harvard Business
School. When asked whether federal taxes affected their investments only ten percent of the upper bracket investors in the group
studied volunteered answers indicating that the long term capital
gains tax affected the timing of a shift in their investments.45 The
two questions asked of the group were very general in nature and
were directed primarily at ascertaining the tax effects upon the
investment capacity of the individuals and the types of investments
which they selected.46 The authors of the study state that the nature of the questions probably resulted in significantly fewer
answers directed to the lock-in effect than would have been the
case if the questions had been aimed more specifically at that
consideration.47 The 746 individuals studied were selected from
persons in various cities whose names were contained in the customer files of stockbrokers. The authors of the study admit the
possibility of the inclusion of a disproportionate number of active
traders but say this is unlikely because at the wealth levels within
which the study was primarily made most persons mvn stock and
even those who do not are likely to be on brokers' customer lists.48
Mr. Surrey believes the lock-in effect would become harmful
if the capital gain rate were raised and the other Code provisions,
including ordinary income rates, remained the same.49 This view
is shared by several economists, including Mr. Heller.60 Mr. Surrey, again with Mr. Heller concurring,51 would solve this problem
by taxing unrealized capital gains upon transfers of property at
death or by gift, with a carry-over basis as an alternative legislative
proposal.52 The first method would cause serious liquidity problems
•H Id. at 386.
45 Id. at 384. The study upon which Mr. Heller relies is BUTIERS, THOMPSON &

BOLLINGER, EFF.ECrS OF TAXATION [oN] INVESTMENT :SY INDIVIDUALS (1953).
46 BUTIERS, THOMPSON & BOLLINGER, op. cit. supra note 45, at 45, 513.
47 Id. at 45, 340, 341, 348, 513.
48Id. at 12,348,452,456.
49 Surrey, supra note 24, at 1018 n.95.
50 See the view of Heller, Carl Shoup, and J. Keith Butters, in 1955 Hearings 310,
311, 314.
511955 Hearings 310.
li2 Surrey, supra note 24, at 1018 n.95.
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for a substantial percentage of estates,53 and particularly of small
estates. The extreme nature of the problem where decedent owned
a non-liquid family business is obvious. The Surrey solution could
not be completely effective to the extent that investors, being
human, will delay a transaction which causes a tax to be levied
immediately although the tax appears to be inevitable. In addition, the investor will receive the income from the funds which
would pay the tax, so long as he delays the transaction. The difficulties involved in solution of the lock-in problem, among other
things, have led a number of authors to propose a "rollover" provision for capital assets, whereby gain would not be recognized and
basis would be carried over if the funds received from sale of a
capital asset were reinvested within a certain time. Gain not properly reinvested would be taxed.54 In this context and in the
context of the averaging problem, Mr. Surrey stated that he believes nothing in the Constitution prevents Congress from taxing
each year the increase in value of an asset, whether or not the
increase has been realized.55 He has suggested no such legislation.
The administrative problems are obvious. He has proposed an
averaging provision for capital gains.
A substantial number of economists feel that the lower rate on
capital gain has made possible an adequate amount of savings and
investment despite extremely high rates on the ordinary income
of those taxpayers who do the significant saving and investing.58
It is only in deference to this view that Mr. Surrey would retain
any separate rate treatment of capital gain.57 He does not believe
that his proposed maximum rate of approximately forty-five percent, coupled with lower ordinary income rates, increased allowance for capital losses, and full taxation of the interest from state
and municipal bonds would have any harmful effect on the economy.58 His views are supported by some economists.59 There are,
53 If unrealized gains were constructively realized at death in those estates now taxed
under the estate tax, the total taxes to be paid at death would be increased- in the
aggregate- by 40%, The percentage increase would be greatest for smaller estates. Steger,
Economic Consequences of Substantial Changes in the Method of Taxing Capital Gains
and Losses, in 2 1959 Cm.lPENDIUM 1261, 1280 (1959).
54 See, e.g., Dan Throop Smith, supra note 37; Clark, The Paradox of Capital Gains:
Taxable Income That Ought Not To Be Currently Taxed, in 2 1959 COMPENDIUM 1243,
1247; Miller, Taxation of Capital Gains, in 2 1959 COMPENDIUM 1257; Silverstein, The
Capital Asset Definition, in 2 1959 CoMPENDIUM 1285, 1295.
551955 Hearings 323,
56 See the following opinions: Heller, Shoup and Butters in 1955 Hearings, 310, 311,
314; Paul McCracken, in 1955 Hearings 97; Dan Throop Smith, supra note 37.
57 1955 Hearings 320.
58 1955 Hearings 344.
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of course, those who believe any increase in the capital gain rate
would be harmful,60 and perhaps those who believe capital gain
could be treated as ordinary income with no ill effects.61
After any period of inflation, especially one of the nature and
duration experienced by the United States in the past twenty years,
a portion of most realized capital gains will be illusory. From time
to time proposals are advanced which are designed to take closer
account of this fact in taxing capital gain. 62 The administrative
difficulties would be formidable. Moreover, there are those who
believe a capital gains tax on the illusory value has a desirable
counter-cyclical economic effect. 63 It is arguable that any separate
and lower rate on capital gains, including the present separate rate
structure, does some measure of rough justice in an inflationary
period. 64 Mr. Surrey's proposed maximum rate of forty-five percent would give no relief from ordinary income rates to the small
investor whose rate is already beneath forty-five percent. It is, of
course, impossible to determine to what extent such small investors
who have held property since the early forties view the present
treatment of capital gain as a rough allowance for inflated property
values. To the extent that they do so, they will presumably be
strongly opposed to Mr. Surrey's proposal to take away the "allowance."
Mr. Surrey himself does not believe the income tax, including
the capital gains tax, should take inflation into account. Furthermore, he believes it to be equitable to put an additional tax bite
on the investor who has a hedge against inflation, because those
on a fixed income have no hedge. He goes on to say that we will
be lost in the wilderness if we try to separate illusory gain from
real gain, a position ·widely held. 65 However, his statement that
we should tax the investor upon illusory gains because some people
have no illusory gains is open to criticism. There seems to be no
more equity in trying to put the investor who shifts investments
rm See the following opinions: Heller, Shoup, and Butters, in 1955 Hearings 310, 311,

814.
60 Brown, in 1955 Hearings 307; Dan Throop Smith, supra note 37; Magill, supra
note 37; cf. McCracken, in 1955 Hearings 97.
61 Cf. Groves, Taxation of Capital Gains, in 2 1959 CoMPENDIUM 1193.
62 See, e.g., Corbin, New Proposals for Capital Gains Taxation, 34 TAXES 663, 668
(1956); Uhr, Implications of "New Proposals for Capital Gains Taxation," 35 TAXES 267
(1957).
63See, e.g., Heller, in 1955 Hearings 328,347.
64 Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains Arguments, 35 TAXES 247, 255 (1957).
65 1955 Hearings 330.
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in the position of the recipient of a fixed income than in trying
to put such an investor in the position of the wage earner, who
suffers only one additional tax as a result of inflation and thus is
better off than the investor for the following reasons. The wage
earner has been on the whole quite able to maintain his relative
income position during the period of inflation since World War
II. 66 As the wage earner's income rises during inflation he pays
more income tax. During a period of inflation, ceteris paribus,
the investor's income from his property will rise and he will also
pay more income tax. The value of his property will rise to reflect
its increased production of income. If the investor changes the
form of his property he realizes the inflationary gain, pays a capital
gains tax, and is left with fewer dollars to invest. After reinvestment he will have fewer dollars of disposable income than before,
and thus is hurt more than the wage earner, who is not forced to
capitalize his earning power and pay a tax on its increase when he
changes jobs.
3. Mr. Surrey's Views on the Definition of Capital Gain. Mr.
Surrey's criticisms of the nature and complexities of the statutory
definition of capital gains. are lengthy and effective. His views are
necessarily affected by the fact that he does not believe separate
taxation of capital gain is desirable in the first place. In another
narrower area, that of multiple trusts, he is willing to 1\Trestle with
an extremely difficult definition when he believes that definition
to be necessary for equitable taxation. 67 In the capital gains area
he apparently concludes that a truly satisfactory definition of capital gain is impossible, and that the best to be hoped for is an
uneasy truce between taxpayer and government. 68 Mr. Heller is
apparently not in complete accord on the non-availability of a
satisfactory working definition. 69
Mr. Surrey states that Congress, in defining capital gain, has
attempted the difficult task of separating investment activities from
business activities, speculation, and the rewards of personal effort70
and that the difficulties of so doing are compounded by tax recognition of corporations and partnerships as separate entities for
some purposes.71 In general, he feels most of the present defini66 Bach,

in 1955 Hearings 48, 54.

67 See text accompanying note 120 infra.
68 Surrey, in 1955 Hearings 324.
69 Heller, in 1955 Hearings 345.
70 Surrey, supra note 24, at 990, 999, 1001.

71Id. at 1008-15.
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tional provisions are too specific.72 The distinction between investment gain and business gain is now enforced primarily by the
definition of capital assets. Mr. Surrey apparently believes this tool
should be accompanied by further congressional distinctions
among the causes of an increase in the value of property - for
example, between rises attributable to taxpayers' individual efforts
and those not so attributable.78 Further, he criticizes the definition of a capital asset because of its broad inclusion - "property" coupled with specific exclusions. He impliedly would favor the
method of a broad exclusion with specific inclusions.74
In the area of distinguishing speculation from investment, Mr.
Surrey is highly critical of the present short holding period, and
of the exclusive use of the holding period to separate speculators
from investors.75 He, of course, proposes a longer holding period,
which would eliminate many problems in this area and in the
business-investment distinction area as well. Mr. Surrey and Mr.
Caplin both have repeatedly criticized the present capital gain
treatment of the large-scale exchange speculator who holds for
over six months.76 Mr. Surrey discusses the fact that such activity
has been held to be a trade or business, but that the assets were not
found to be held for sale to customers.77 In the same article he
discusses the Corn Products Refining Company case,78 where the
Supreme Court found corn futures to be non-capital assets although
not held for sale to customers in the ordinary sense of the phrase.
Neither Mr. Surrey nor Mr. Caplin expressly suggests the following, but it is conceivable in view of their opposition to capital gain
for professional speculators that they might try to tax such speculators' gains as ordinary income under the rationale of Corn
Products.
Mr. Surrey's most telling examples of 'the difficulty of the capital gains definition are in the area where the separate treatment
of the corporate entity complicates the problem. For example, he
cites the problems of corporate liquidations, distributions, accumulation of income, and the transfer of appreciated non-capital
12 Jd. at 1016.
78 Surrey, supra

note 24, at 988.

74/bid.

Id. at 999.
Caplin, supra note 2, at 843; Surrey, supra note 24, at 1000; Surrey, supra note 25,
at 819 n.21.
77 Surrey, supra note 24, at 992, 1000.
78 Com Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955). Surrey, supra note
24, at 992.
75

76
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assets into a corporate shell followed by sale of the stock.70 Many
of these problems would melt away if a feasible method could be
devised and enacted to tax undistributed corporate profits directly
to shareholders, but no such plan appears to be in the offing.
B. The "Double Tax" on Corporate Profits

I. The Dividends Received Credit. Both men favor elimination of the dividends received credit and exclusion.80 Mr. Surrey is opposed to these provisions because they are not sufficiently
geared to the amount of overtaxation suffered by the recipient of
dividends and ordinarily, he feels, give greater proportionate relief from overtaxation to the high-bracket taxpayer.81 He does not
seem particularly concerned about giving alternative relief, but
does feel that if Congress decides to do so the English method for
taking account of the corporate tax should be adopted. This
method, in brief, is to add to dividends received the corporate tax
paid thereon and include the total in the recipients' income; a
credit of the amount of the corporate tax paid is then given to the
taxpayer.82 However, there would be certain difficulties involved
in the adoption of such a plan, such as numerous refunds and some
windfalls to shareholders.83 Mr. Surrey has not otherwise addressed himself specifically to the problems of double taxation and
taxation of retained corporate profits, except as these problems
affect the capital gain provisions. Neither he nor Mr. Caplin has
mentioned in publication any plan for a reduction of corporate
tax rates.
2. A Solution of the "Double Taxation" Problem Proposed
by Mr. Caplin. Mr. Surrey, while he has not written specifically
on the double taxation problem, recognizes the historical trend
toward attempting to eliminate two taxes on the same income.
Mr. Caplin, however, in a recent article, has advocated a somewhat startling approach-a large step in the other direction. He
would divide all business enterprises into two groups. The first
of these would have an extremely low limitation on the number
of shareholders or members and on net worth. Enterprises in this
79 Surrey, supra note 24, at 1008-15.
so Caplin, supra note 2, at 845. Surrey, supra note 25, at 820-21.
81 Surrey, supra note 25, at 820-21.
82 Id. at 821 n.25.
83 Shoup, The Dividend Exclusion and Credit in the Revenue Code of 1954, 8 NAT'L
TAX J. 136, 145 (1955); Dan Throop Smith, Two Years of Republican Tax Policy: An
Economic Appraisal, 8 NAT'L TAX J. 2, 9 (1955).
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group would be taxed generally as partnerships are now taxed.
The second group would consist of all other business enterprises,
whether now designated corporations, partnerships, associations,
trusts, proprietorships, or what-have-you. Enterprises in the second group would be taxed on their taxable income on a schedule
of sharply progressive rates beginning at ten percent and rising as
high as revenue needs require. Owners of such enterprises would
include in their incomes the distributions of the enterprises, in
accord with earnings and profits principles now applied to corporations.84
Mr. Caplin offers such a scheme as a solution to the complexities
now arising from the numerous available taxable business entities
and the differences between them: corporation, partnership, subchapter S, subchapter R, association, proprietorship, trust.85 His
plan would itself create substantial complexities, however. If his
scheme were enacted it would still be necessary to categorize items
of income according to their source. Obviously he would want
to distinguish personal effort income-salaries and wages-from
business enterprise income, for the latter would be taxed twice if
distributed. Since these two categories do not neatly cover all
types of income, presumably there would have to be a third category for "non-enterprise income" which would arise neither from
personal efforts nor from an enterprise. The necessary existence
of this third category covering such items as interest, rents, and
royalties would continue tax discrimination among items of income not attributable solely to personal efforts. For example, if
a coal royalty were not enterprise income, would there not still be
discrimination between the royalty holder and the owner of the
mining operation, which would pay an enterprise tax? Is the existence of an "enterprise" sufficient or desirable reason for such
discrimination?
The use of a business enterprise concept would require a
broader use of the difficult distinction between income from a
business enterprise and income from a non-enterprise. The distinction would presumably be somewhat similar to those now used
in defining a "trade or business" for capital gains86 and section 162
84 Caplin, Income Tax Pressures on the Form of Business Organization: ls It Time
for a "Doing Business" Tax? 47 VA. L. R.Ev. 249, 260 (1961).
85 Id. at 261.
80 INT. R.Ev. CoDE OF 1954, § 1221.
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purposes,87 and an "association" for corporate taxation purposes.BB
The distinction in the case of the coal royalty and the coal mining
operation is fairly clear, but the in-between cases would be harder.
Further, what should be done about businesses performing services
for customers? For instance, would an individual stock broker, commission broker, realtor, or Ia-wyer be engaged in an enterprise? If
not, would a large brokers' partnership, or a large law firm, or a
large real estate dealers' partnership?
The distinction between personal effort income and enterprise
income would also be difficult. The problem, of course, is now
faced to a limited degree in the context of the closely-held corporation when an officer-shareholder receives an excessive "salary."
Mr. Caplin's plan would require an extension of the distinction to
most large partnerships and associations. If the enterprise classification included large areas of economic activity now organized in
partnership form, there would be few "yardsticks" with which a
partner's income could be measured to determine how much was
properly salary and how much properly enterprise income. For
instance, how would one determine what portion of a senior law
partner's inc,ome is properly attributable to his personal efforts?
To begin treating a large number of enterprises as corporations
are now treated would considerably increase the number of taxpayers who must wrestle with all the problems of corporate distribution, including earnings and profits, mergers, redemptions,
liquidations, and sales of shares.B9 Furthermore, a progressive
rate and the exemption of small enterprises would greatly increase
the advantage of multiple entities, thus enormously expanding the
pressures and complexities surrounding those sections dealing
with multiple entities-269, 482, 1501, 1551 and the like.90
The complexities which Mr. Caplin seeks to eliminate are indeed severe, but they have for the most part been dealt with for
some time by the tax bar, the revenue service, the courts, Congress,
and the taxpaying public. The process of education in their
intricacies is to some degree accomplished. Mr. Caplin's proposal
would require substantial re-education in new complexities.
Finally, it is not clear to what extent the present corporate tax
is a regressive tax passed on to the consumer or to the wage earner.
B7 INT.
INT.
89 lNT.
90 INT.

BB

REv. CODE OF
REv. CoDE OF
REv. CoDJLOF
REv. CODE OF

1954,
1954,
1954,
1954,

§ 162.
§ 7701.
§§ 301-82.
§§ 269, 482, 1501, 1551.
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Many feel that a substantial part of it is so passed on.01 If Mr.
Caplin's proposed tax were passed on it would affect more consumers than the present corporate tax, which reaches only purchasers from corporations. On the other hand, the progressive
nature of the proposed tax would prevent large enterprises from
passing to the consumer as great a proportion of the tax as their
smaller competitors could. Although this might take some tax
burden off the consumer, it would endanger the competitive position and the after-tax profit margin of large enterprises. Furthermore, a progressive tax appears unsuited to business enterprises
because it cannot take into account the varying sizes of the incomes
of the shareholders in a multi-shareholder enterprise.

C. Mr. Caplin's Opinions on Certain Narrower
Corporate Taxation Issues
Mr. Caplin has addressed himself to several other problems in
the corporate area, including subchapter S, the thin-incorporation
doctrine, certain of the problems in the spin-off area, and subchapter R. Basically he believes the fiction of the separate corporate entity to be one of the cornerstones of our tax law and not
lightly to be disregarded.92 He is opposed, however, to creation of
new types of taxable entities.93 On this latter ground he has
strongly attacked subchapter S, urging that it either be repealed
in toto or amended to conform as precisely as possible to the provisions for taxing partnerships. If the latter approach is taken, he
has made ten recommendations to the legislators,94 all generally
intended to bring subchapter S treatment closer to partnership
treatment:

I. Limit election to new corporations, and make the earnings and profits account, if still used, coincide exactly
with taxable income. Such treatment is proposed in
order to eliminate the problems now encountered in
handling pre-election earnings and profits.
2. Put a dollar limit on net worth and eliminate the restrictions on personal holding company income.
Income Taxation and Dividend Income, in 3 1959 CoMPENDIUllr 1579, 1580.
92 Caplin, supra note 7, at 54.
93 Caplin, Subchapter S vs. Partnership: A Proposed Legislative Program, 46 VA. L.

91 Darling,

REv. 61, 80 (1960).
IH[bid.
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3. Limit the events causing termination of the election to
4.
5.

6.

7.
8.

9.
10.

increase flexibility of the subchapter S device in some
situations and minimize avoidance in others.
Curtail severely the right to renew the election to minimize avoidance.
Treat the fiscal year problem as it is treated in the partnership provisions, again to eliminate possibilities of
avoidance.
Allocate taxable income for any part of a year to the
shareholdings as they were during that part of the year to
prevent shifting of accrued income.
Do not allow shareholders to be deemed employees except in limited cases.
Allow distributions in kind to be made in the same
manner as distributions in cash.
Preserve the non-dividend status of previously-taxed income despite termination of the election or sale of stock.
Allow more latitude generally in withdrawals.
Treat net operating loss as it is treated in the partnership provisions-allow the excess over basis to be taken
whenever a basis is restored.

In the context of the thin-incorporation doctrine, Mr. Caplin
believes the courts have gone too far in preferring substance over
form. He believes the statute says "interest" and "dividends," and
clear debt instruments should not be denied debt status absent
evidence of intent not to have a debtor-creditor relationship.911
In the application of section 355, Mr. Caplin has urged a liberal
construction of the five-year active business requirement, with the
government's main protection against avoidance transactions being
the "device" terminology of section 355 (a) (1) (B).96 Both Mr.
Surrey and Mr. Caplin have spoken disparagingly of section 1361,
which permits a narrowly-limited class of partnerships to elect to
be taxed as corporations.97
D.

The Depletion Allowances

The depletion allowances have long been a target of tax reformers and Messrs. Surrey and Caplin are among the attackers.
95 Caplin,
96 Caplin,

supra note 7, at 61.
The Five-Year Business Rule for Corporate Separations, 35

(1957).
97 Caplin, supra note 84, at 261; Surrey, supra note 4, at 1147 n.4 (i).

TAXES
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Mr. Surrey refers to the allowances as an unwarranted tax preference deserving serious congressional study. 08 Mr. Caplin has
been more specific; he would lower all percentage rates and allow
the new percentages only until capitalized costs were recovered.99
The rate reduction advocated by the two men100 would mitigate
to some degree the effect of the loss of the depletion allowance.101
However, to the extent that the loss of the depletion allowance
did not result in a rise in retail mineral prices, it would cause the
price of mineral property to fall in relation to the price of other
property, and this would indeed hurt the individual holders of
mineral properties. The question of the extent to which mineral
retail prices would rise leads to the consideration of the corporate
position in the depletion picture.
A substantial majority of the depletion dollars go to large corporations.102 No decrease in the tax rate for these corporations has
been proposed, and the loss of the depletion allowance would bite
deeply here. The bite would pass on to humans in one of two
directions: to the consumer in the form of higher prices on petroleum products and by-products and to the stock.holder in the form
of lower dividends. To the extent that the depletion allowance
has heretofore been reflected in lower mineral prices to consumers,
there would seem to be no injustice in shifting the burden of the
allowance from the government to the consumer. But one can
have more sympathy for injury suffered in the form of lower
dividends and stock prices by one who purchased shares in an oil
company at a price which discounted the existence of the depletion
allowance.

E. The Exemption of State and Municipal Bond Interest
Mr. Surrey calls the exemption of interest on state and local
bonds indefensible in terms of income tax policy. It is, he says,
an undesirable solution of federal-state relationships with the
wealthy an undeserving third-party beneficiary. He favors full
taxation of the interest and believes the constitutionality of such a
tax no longer debatable.103
98 Surrey,

supra note 25, 819.
oo Caplin, supra note 2, at 849.
100 While the two officials speak generally of a 25% reduction in rates, they also speak
of lowering the maximum rate to 65%, which is slightly more than a 25% reduction.
101 lNT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 613 (b).
102 Gray, in 1955 Hearings 351; Stanley, in 1955 Hearings 384.
103 Surrey, supra note 25, at 817, 818.
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The Personal Deductions

I. The Deduction for Charitable Contributions. Nearly all
of the personal deductions are under fire by both men. A major
emphasis is placed on the deduction for charitable contributions.
Mr. Caplin recommends that the deduction in all cases be limited
to the lower of fair market value or basis. He favors such a provision as a method of eliminating a number of avoidance schemes
and solving as well the problem of gifts of section 306 stock to
charities.104 Mr. Surrey takes a slightly different tack. He recommends inclusion in the taxpayer's income of the difference between basis and fair market value, especially if the appreciation
not realized would have been ordinary income to the donor. If
the income not realized would have been capital gain, he is willing
to make an exception if the pressure for such an exception is
strong.105 In 1956 he recommended such a statutory change, but
significantly wondered aloud why the Treasury had not, in all
cases, attempted to tax the appreciation in value to the donor
under the case law of section 61.1° 6 He cited Austin v. Commissioner101 and Anthony's Estate v. Commissioner.108 In addition,
Helvering v. Horst,10 9 Commissioner v. First State Bank of Stratford,110 and United States v. General Shoe Corp.111 would seem
to be applicable. Mr. Surrey also urges a denial of deductions
for all expenses incurred in building up the value of an asset
donated to charity.112 Both gentlemen believe the family charitable
foundation deserves scrutiny.113
2. The Interest Deduction. Mr. Caplin urges denial of the
interest deduction on all loans made to purchase life insurance.114
Mr. Surrey goes farther. He urges first that a maximum be put
104 Caplin, supra note 2, at 849.
105 Surrey, Memorandum Regarding Certain Items in the List of Substantive Unin•
tended Benefits, Hearings on Technical Amendments to the IRC Before a Subcommittee
of the House Ways and Means Committee, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., vol. 5, at 436 (1956).
106 Ibid. After losing on two attempts to tax as income to the donor the appreciation
in the value of farm products donated to charity, the Commissioner in 1955 issued a
ruling that such appreciation would not be taxed to the donor. Campbell v. Prothro, 209
F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1954); White v. Broderick, 104 F. Supp. 213 (D. Kan. 1952); REv. RuL.
55-138, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 223.
107161 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1947).
108 155 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1946).
109 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
110 168 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1948).
111282 F .2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960).
112 Surrey, supra note 105, at 436.
113 Caplin, supra note 2, at 849; Surrey, supra note 25, at 826.
114 Caplin, supra note 2, at 851.
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on the amount of the deduction. Second, he urges a broadening
of sections 264 (a) (2) and 265 (2) plus the enactment and vigorous
enforcement of a broad in terrorem provision denying the deduction whenever a transaction lacks business reality. The transaction
would be deemed to lack business reality whenever its prime end
was only the deduction plus a sale at capital gain rates, a gift to
charity, or the like.111s

3. The Deductions for State and Local Taxes, Medical Expenses and Casualty Losses. Mr. Surrey favors retention of the
deduction for state income taxes, elimination of the deduction for
state excise taxes, and a maximum limit on the deduction for state
property taxes.116 He sees the latter deduction as an unjustified
subsidy to home owners and mortgagors.117 Defenders of states
rights would object to Mr. Surrey's foregoing proposals on the
ground that if the federal government is to make an allowance for
the revenue needs of the states, it should not discriminate in favor
of citizens of states raising the major portion of their revenue by
an income tax and against citizens of those raising the major portion of their revenue by excise or property taxes. Arguably,
dictating the revenue-raising methods of the states is not the proper
concern of the federal government.
Mr. Surrey would raise the present "three percent of adjusted
gross" limitation on the medical deduction to five percent and
institute a similar limitation on deductions for casualty losses.118
Along with the restrictions on the personal deductions, he favors
a lowering of the ten percent standard deduction to three or four
percent.11°
G.

Miscellaneous Areas of Avoidance: Multiple Trusts,
Life Insurance, Sales of Life Interests,
Deferred Compensation

I. Multiple Trusts. In response to congressional committees,
Mr. Surrey has addressed himself to several less significant areas
where he believes unjustified tax avoidance occurs. Included are
multiple trusts, life insurance, sale of life interests, and deferred
compensation plans. In the multiple trust area he sees three prime
llts Surrey, supra note 25, at 826; Surrey,
116 Surrey, supra note 25, at 826, 827.
117 Ibid.
11s Id. at 825, 826.
110 Id. at 826. Mr. Surrey says 3 or 4%

gross income.

supra note 105, at 437.

of gross income, but he must mean adjusted
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avoidance patterns: (1) the use of a large number of accumulation
trusts with a common beneficiary; (2) the transfer of undivided
interests in an appreciated asset whose sale will produce ordinary
income, to multiple trusts prior to sale, investment of proceeds,
and accumulation of income; and (3) the use of multiple trusts
each distributing at intervals of six or more years to avoid the fiveyear throwback rule.120
He proposes a threefold attack. First, he would either completely eliminate the exception to the throwback rule for termination of trusts in existence over nine years; or he would modify the
exception to require that the trust have been in existence beyond
the lives of beneficiaries living when the trust was created. Second,
he would allow the benefit of only one of each of the following
provisions to a beneficiary of more than one trust: the $2,000
floor on the throwback rule, the limitation of the throwback rule
to five years, and the exception to the throwback rule for accumulations during minority. Third, in addition to, and possibly as a
substitute for, the second attack, he would require combination
of multiple trusts into one trust for tax purposes. Trusts would
be combined where each trust accumulates income for the same
beneficiary or group of beneficiaries.121 He favors a broad general
rule, supported by regulations and applied case by case, as a
standard for requiring combination.122 He has given a suggestion
of what should be included in such a rule:
"Thus, trust income could be regarded as being accumulated
for a beneficiary if in the normal operation of the trust, under
the happening of events reasonably to be expected or which
are anticipated in the trust instrument~ it is a reasonable conclusion that the accumulated income will either be distributed
to that beneficiary or its disposition will become subject to his
control. A class of beneficiaries could be treated as a single
beneficiary if the interests of the class in the trust make that
treatment appropriate. " 123
It is not entirely clear under the above standard whether combination would be required merely because a disposition to certain
beneficiaries upon happening of a very unlikely event had been
expressly anticipated in the trust. It is doubtful that combination
should be required in such a case. Mr. Surrey recognizes the
120 Surrey, supra note 105, at
121 Id. at 439.
122 Id. at 440.
123 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

439.
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difficulty of administering a rule such as he suggests, but he feels
the result here justifies the complexity-in noticeable contrast to
his feeling that the result did not justify the complexity in the
capital gains area. It seems quite likely that the enactment of such
a forced-combination provision would result in a proliferation of
often-muddy case law similar to that which sprang up around the
Clifford doctrine124 prior to its codification. However, if it is
desirable to attack the multiple trust problem, it might be best
from a legislative standpoint to commence the attack with a broad
provision, such as Mr. Surrey suggests, and clarify with codification
only after the various problems and patterns had been thoroughly
learned during development of the case law. Mr. Surrey is opposed to making proof that the multiplicity has as its prime purpose the avoidance of taxes a requirement for combination. He
feels the simple existence of two trusts with one beneficiary is
sufficient reason for combination. He would not make allowances
for the situation, for example, where because of quirks of local
law the estate planner sets up both an inter vivas and a testamentary trust for the same beneficiaries.125
2. Life Insurance. The failure to tax interest earned upon
life insurance premiums during the lifetime of the insured is regarded by both officials as undesirable.126 Neither has proposed
a change in the law, however, and Mr. Surrey regards such a
change as politically unfeasible.127 Although this comment does
not deal generally with the estate tax, it is worthy of note that
important changes are proposed in the life insurance area. Mr.
Caplin impliedly would favor restoration of the payment of premiums as a test for inclusion of life insurance in the gross estate; 128
Mr. Surrey has expressly proposed its restoration.129 Mr. Surrey
has made further proposals in order to equate the treatment of
life insurance with annuities and accumulation trusts. He would
repeal section 2037 (a) (2) 130 and thus include in the gross estate
any property the enjoyment of which could be obtained only by
surviving decedent. A similar change would be made in section
124 Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940). For comments on the ensuing case law,
see Stockstrom v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 491, 496 (8th Cir. 1945); Suhl' v. Commissioner,
126 F.2d 283, 288 (6th Cir. 1942).
121l Surrey, supra note 105, at 441.
120 Caplin, supra note 2, at 851, 852; Surrey, supra note 25, at 821.
127 Surrey, supra note 25, at 821.
128 Caplin, supra note 2, at 851, 852.
129 Surrey, supra note 105, at 438.
130 INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 2037 (a) (2).
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2039 (a)181 in order to tax any annuity obtainable only by surviving
the decedent. Finally, Mr. Surrey would repeal section 2039 (c),132
which now exempts from the estate tax annuities paid by qualified
employee pension plans.133
3. Sales of Life Interests. Mr. Surrey would change the law
now applied to sale of life interests. His proposal is to deny any
basis, treat the entire proceeds as ordinary income, and attempt to
avoid "lumping" into one tax year income which absent sale would
have been received over many years. The latter result would be
accomplished by applying a marginal rate ascertained from the
taxpayer's marginal rates in the five years preceding sale. If this
deters sales of life interests, Mr. Surrey is not worried because he
does not see any reason why life tenants should sell their interests.134
4. Deferred Compensation. Finally, Mr. Surrey is concerned
with the avoidance devices in the corporate executive compensation area. Most of these have been treated earlier-new laws for
stock options and pension trust terminations and tougher enforcement in the fringe benefit area. In addition, he believes that individual deferred-compensation plans should be subjected to
coverage requirements similar to those now imposed upon taxbenefited non-discriminatory pension plans.1311
H. The Low-Bracket Shelters

There are certain tax preferences benefiting primarily lowbracket taxpayers. These, too, have been criticized. Slated for
elimination if the new officials both have their way are the sick-pay
exclusion, the retirement income credit, and the exemption of
Social Security payments.136 Mr. Caplin would eliminate the retirement income credit but does not discuss the exclusion of
Social Security payments.137 In view of the creation of the retirement income credit partially for the purpose of equalizing treatment of those who do and those who do not receive Social
Security,138 his proposal is subject to the criticism that it simply
131 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2039 (a).
132 INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 2039 (c).
133 Surrey, supra note 105, at 438, 439.
134 Surrey, supra note 105, at 441.
135 Surrey, supra note 25, at 822 n.31.
136 Caplin, supra note 2, at 845, 846; Surrey,
137 Caplin, supra note 2, at 845, 846.
138 Surrey, supra note 25, at 823.

supra note 25, at 823.
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restores the previous inequity. Mr. Surrey's suggestion of eliminating both benefits would produce more horizontal equity in the
tax system.189 Mr. Surrey doubts generally the wisdom of favoring elderly taxpayers with an extra exemption, extra medical
deduction allowance, the retirement income credit, and the Social
Security exclusion.14° Furthermore, he is concerned with exemption, often at the behest of organized labor, of wage earners' fringe
benefits. He apparently would halt the trend toward exempting
more fringe benefits and where possible would reverse it. He
proposes serious study of the conceptual and administrative problems involved in the present exemption of employer-paid medical
expenses and board and lodging, and the problems which will be
involved if company-paid vacations and the like become more
common.141 Mr. Surrey advocates elimination of the child care
deduction as being minor, complicated, and only on the borderline of business expenses. However, he does not consider this a
first order of business.142

I. A New Tax Court and a New Code
Finally, in the area of specific reforms, Mr. Caplin proposes
study of the need for a court of tax appeals to dispose finally of all
but constitutional issues in tax litigation, and the need for a paid
commission to study thoroughly the possibility of drafting a new
code.143

V.

CONCLUSION:

A

LOWER RATE STRUCTURE PLUS

BROADENING OF THE

TAX

BASE

Mr. Surrey estimates that his increases in the tax base would
produce approximately an extra twelve billion dollars at present
rates and that his proposed reduced rate structure applied to his
proposed new base would bring in approximately the same total
revenue as is now received.144 This rate structure would have a
top rate of approximately sixty-five percent with the other rates
reduced by approximately twenty-five percent from today's level.1 45
130 Ibid.
140 Ibid.
141 Surrey, supra
142 Surrey, supra
143 Caplin, supra
144 Surrey, supra

145Ibid.

note 25, at 824.
note 25, at 826.
note 2, at 853.
note 25, at 829.
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Mr. Surrey would consider, and Mr. Caplin proposes, a splitting
of the bottom bracket with a ten percent bottom rate on the first
two thousand dollars of taxable income.146 Both officials advocate
introduction of some type of averaging provision for ordinary
income.147
While Mr. Surrey estimates that the effect of the increase in
the tax base would be equivalent to the effect of the lower rates
when total revenue is considered, he does not give any estimated
comparison of the two effects for particular income brackets. In
other words, he does not give an opinion on whether the average
amount paid by individual taxpayers in a particular bracket
would be more or less if his proposals were adopted. The tax
shelters he attacks are by no means evenly distributed up and down
the rate scale, but are concentrated in: the high-bracket areas, ·with
the result that the actual average effective rates in the high brackets
are already substantially below the stated rates.148 One can imagine that legislators of all political hues would be interested in
knowing whether the average amount paid by individual high and
low bracket taxpayers will actually be more or less if the proposed
legislation is adopted. The late Randolph Paul, in proposing
substantially similar reforms, indicated that if they were enacted
most high bracket taxpayers would actually pay more in total
taxes.149
The stated reason of the two me~ for their proposals is a present and increasing ineffectiveness of the income tax caused primarily by the difficulty of administration and low taxpayer morale.urn
Numerous other writers have advanced similar proposals for similar reasons.151 However, not all authorities agree on the reasons
for the reforms. Walter J. Blum, Chicago University tax specialist,
sees neither a noticeable drop in taxpayer morale nor great difficulties in administration of the law. In his opinion, the most
vociferous supporters of a broadening of the tax base are those who
146 Caplin, supra note 2, at 845; Surrey, supra note 25, at 830.
147 Caplin, supra note 2, at 846; Surrey, in 1955 Hearings 314;

Surrey, supra note 24,
at 1018.
148 Surrey, supra note 25, at 815, 816; Musgrave, How Progressive Is the Income Tax,
in 3 1959 COMPENDIUM 2223, 2230.
149 Paul, Erosion of the Tax Base and the Rate Structure, 11 TAX L. R.Ev. 203, 220
(1956).
150 Caplin, supra note 2, at 839, 840; Surrey, supra note 2, at A3053.
151 See, e.g., the bibliography given in Surrey, supra note 25, at 817 n.14 and in Surrey,
supra note 4, at 1146 n.3.
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desire, or feel the inevitability of, greater federal expenditures in
the near future and want an effective instrument for raising the
revenue. He claims personally to favor base broadening and rate
lowering solely on grounds of fairness. Blum sees at present an
uneasy alliance between those who want primarily a broader base
and those who want primarily lower rates, and doubts the stability
of the alliance.152 His comments raise the question of the likelihood of enactment of the proposed changes.
Mr. Surrey has anticipated certain of the political reactions to
his suggestions. He believes the problem attacked to be one common to all nations with progressive income taxation and notes that
conservatives have generally been fairly effective in legislating
shelters from high rates. The conservative, says Mr. Surrey, favors
lower rates; but elimination of tax shelters with no effective safeguard against renewal of high rates leaves the wealthy taxpayer
in danger of a much more painful tax bite than ever suffered
before.153 The conservative viewpoint anticipated by Mr. Surrey
has already been voiced by the president of the National Association of Real Estate Boards, who asks, "What assurances would the
American people have that once they had given up all these deductions, the next Congress wouldn't start pushing up the rates to
meet the cost of expanding the welfare state?"154
Mr. Surrey believes the liberal to be in no less a dilemma on
the question of reducing rates in return for base-broadening. The
liberal legislator must explain to his constituents a most obvious
rate cut from ninety-one percent to sixty-five percent on the incomes of the very wealthy, in return for elimination of shelters
whose nature is comprehended only vaguely, if at all.155 Apparently Mr. Surrey fears intransigent opposition by organized labor;
he has spent some time contending that if labor does not make
compromises to improve the income tax it will face a federal sales
tax.150
Finally, every tax shelter attacked is defended by a vociferous
and powerful pressure group. Their combined influences focused
152 Blum,

Tax Policy and Preferential Provisions in the Income Tax Base, in 1 1959
77-78, 81. For an example of one who wants reform in order to improve
the revenue-raising capacity, see Mills, Preface to Federal Taxation 1958, 44 VA. L. REv.
835, 837 (1958).
153 Surrey, supra note 4, at 1150.
154 Powell, Wall St. Journal, April 3, 1960, p. 14, col. 5.
155 Surrey, supra note 4, at 1150.
156 Surrey, supra note 2, at A3055.
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on a congressman could be awesome indeed. The consideration of
all of the difficulties facing large-scale base-broadening and rate reduction led Professor Blum to predict, in a congressional study of
the matter in 1959, that the ensuing year would see more tax
havens rather than fewer, in the Internal Revenue Code.157

David G. Hill, S.Ed.
157 Blum,

supra note 152, at 82.

